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Abstract 
At fifty, Nigeria’s nation-state project is still being called to question and strong fears are expressed for a 
possible disintegration. Some make bold to suggest that the current contraption may not survive beyond 2015. A 
section of this school thinks that the Nigerian nation-state project was a “mistake” that is about to be corrected. 
Others think it is a noble dream that is slowly being awaken to and feasible in spite of the huge challenges. The 
challenge of the national question which in part rests on the tripod of federalism, resource control and the elusive 
peace in the Niger Delta region is often held culpable for the failure of Nigeria to realize her full potentials as an 
emerging federal African state. Rather than make progress, she is caught in a cycle of debilitating conflict 
imposed on her by what appears to be the struggle of various sections of the Nigerian elite to appropriate control 
of public resources. The continuous exacerbation of the conflict in the Niger Delta and the inability of the post-
independence state in Nigeria to resolve it provide the evidences required by the pessimists to question the 
prospect of the continuous survival of the Nigerian nation-state. This paper critically interrogates the practice of 
federalism, the resource control palaver and the elusive peace in the Niger Delta of post-independence Nigeria. It 
finds a positive correlation between them, but concludes that just as the conditions for conflict and disintegration 
are evident, so are those for sustainable peace, survival and development. The paper points the way towards the 
understanding of these dynamics and their resolution. 
Keywords: Federalism, Niger Delta, Peace, Resource control. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
National security and peace in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria were top on the Yar’adua/Jonathan democratic 
regime’s seven point agenda for socio-political stability and advancement of the nation to one of the top twenty 
economies of the world by 2020. The underlying assumption of this policy was that insecurity and violence, 
among other variables, were responsible for the crisis of development that engulfed the nation for most of her 
post-independence life. Repositioning her on the path of socio-political and economic advancement therefore 
requires conscious and deliberate re-engineering away from the malaise that held her back from progress. The 
policy thrust of the regime on security and peace in the Niger Delta region was unmistakably founded on the 
objective and material historical conditions of the Nigerian federal state bequeathed to it by the preceding 
regimes. This is illustrated by the spate of violent conflicts that engulfed the region, especially since the return of 
the nation to democratic rule in 1999. Giving the fact that the region provides over eighty percent of the petro-
dollar that runs the nation, the absence of peace in the region is tantamount to the loss of monumental national 
revenue capable of bringing the national economy and overall social peace to a precarious state. The position of 
this paper is that the structure of the Nigerian federal state and the nature of the control of natural resources 
within it were the critical contentious issues that enthroned violent conflict and robbed the Niger Delta of peace. 
This process is historically examined in this paper with a view to identifying those issues in the practice of 
federalism and resource control that encouraged violent conflicts and negatively impacted peaceful co-existence. 
It also intends to find useful lessons that may assist the on-going peace building process in the region for the 
overall interest of national peace and security in Nigeria. 
 
2. CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS 
Some concepts are central to this historical interrogation. They include the Niger Delta, federalism, resource 
control and peace. Their clarification is therefore key to our understanding of this discourse. 
 
2.1 THE NIGER DELTA 
The Niger Delta is a territory that covers about 70,000sq. kilometers (Olulu, 2003; Ekpo, 2004) in the 
southernmost part of Nigeria. It stretches from the Nigeria – Cameroon boundary in the east to the Ondo – Ogun 
states boundaries in the west of Nigeria. The area is also bounded in the north by Enugu, Ebonyi, Anambra, Kogi 
and Ekiti states. It is generally bounded in the south by the Atlantic Ocean. 
According to Omoweh (2003:12), the region comprises about 1,600 communities. The  number of 
communities is put at over 3500 and the dialects at not less than 260 in 185 Local Government Areas(LGAs) and 
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nine states of the federation, with a population estimated at over 20million(Ekpo, 2004: 1). The four core states 
are Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. Others are Abia, Cross Rivers, Edo, Imo and Ondo states (Onuoha, 
2005). 
The Niger Delta hosts over 95% of Nigeria’s proven oil and gas reserves. Its natural gas reserves were 
estimated at 174 trillion cubic feet in 2005. Only about 20% of its gas is currently used to generate electricity. It 
is estimated that at its current rate of production, it will last another 110 years. Also, the proven oil reserves 
amount to 32billion barrels. At the current rate of production, it is estimated to last another 37 years (Olulu, 
2003:16; NEEDS Nigeria, 2004). The Niger Delta produces two million barrels of oil per day, which makes 
Nigeria the sixth largest producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In addition, the 
Niger Delta is the world’s second largest wetland, comprising mangrove swamps and low lying alluvial plains at 
the end of the Niger River, one of the great tributaries of sub-Sahara Africa, making it an incredibly fertile land 
(Hurst & Concannon, 2006: 7). 
There are more than fifty distinctive ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. The cultural mix of the peoples is 
as diverse as the languages they speak. Generally, the peoples of the Niger Delta belong to what has been 
described as the high context cultures. In other words, they are more communal than individualistic in lifestyle. 
The family is the basic unit of social organization with the father presiding over the affairs of the family. The 
major occupation of the peoples is farming and fishing. 
By and large, though the Niger Delta and the peoples that inhabit the area are often perceived as a 
single cultural and, sometimes, political unit, the fact however is that this is not historically correct. It is their 
common feeling of political alienation and marginalization in the control of the natural resource which they play 
hosts to and the consequent struggle to redress the situation that provides them the unity of purpose that 
generates the new identity of oneness in the public domain. This explains, partly, not only the horizontal but also 
the vertical direction of violent conflicts in the region. 
 
2.2 FEDERALISM 
Federalism is conceived as ‘the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each 
within a sphere coordinate and independent’ (Wheare, 1964: 187). This definition has remained the benchmark 
for the practice of federalism in all states structured along its principles. Its principle of coordinate and 
independent different levels of government promotes the concept of separation of powers between the central 
government and the component units within a given territory. Federalism is therefore a system of arrangement 
that promotes the sharing of governmental powers within a country. According to Nwabueze(1983:1), it 
promotes the division of governmental powers: 
between a national(nation-wide) government and a number of regionalized governments in 
such a way that each avoids, as a government separately and independently from the others, 
operating directly on persons and property within its territorial area, with a will of its own, and 
its own apparatus for the conduct of its affairs and with an authority in some matters. 
The perspectives on federalism converge on a basic fundamental principle that it is a device for dealing with the 
problem of unity in a plural society. In this regard, Livingstone (1969: 12) lays emphasis on the economic, socio-
political and cultural factors that shape the federal qualities of a state. To him, the objective of federalism is 
compromised unity in diversity. Whereas, Wheare is of the view that each unit should be financially independent, 
Riker (1964: 12) contends that a federal state should be a product of political bargaining among the component 
units. 
However, modern global trends in the practice of federalism suggest a need to rethink the federal 
concept as a panacea to the problem of diversity, especially in multi-ethnic societies. The disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the emergence of two republics from the defunct Federal 
Republic of Czechoslovakia (Obi, 2005: 190-191) and, even in Africa, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia all 
expose the limit and impotence of the federal system. Consequently, it is the position of this paper that a 
combination of Wheare’s financial independence, Livingstone’s sociological factors and Riker’s political 
bargaining, anchored on the morality political culture and situated within the historical trajectories of each 
society should be the minimum benchmark for negotiating a federal state. 
 
2.3 RESOURCE CONTROL 
Roberts and Oladeji (2005: 276) see ‘resource’ as a useful material or substance, which in a technical sense 
refers to the positive interaction between man and nature. It is thus a means designed to satisfy the given ends of 
individual wants and social objectives. According to them, resource is a social relation having two basic 
attributes of utility and functionality. Therefore, the essence of a resource is its functionality, rather than ‘the 
thing itself’. Consequently, when nations or regions within nations struggle for the control of a resource, they 
struggle not for the resource in itself, but for its material or financial value. 
Some scholars have tried to define what is meant by resource control. While one group conceives it as 
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the total take-over of the resources located in the resource producing states by the people of those states, others 
understand it to mean that the stakeholders in the resource-bearing area should manage greater proportions of the 
resources harnessed in those areas (Roberts and Oladeji, 2005: 277). Nevertheless, as presently used in Nigeria, 
resource control may be taken to mean ‘the substantive powers for the community to collect monetary and other 
benefits accruing from the exploitation and use of resources in its domain and deploy same to its developmental 
purposes’(Ya’u, 2001: 46). 
Bannon and Collier (2003) have argued in their study that countries dependent on natural resources for 
governance are most likely to be blighted by conflict. Also, according to Benjamin (1997), conflicts over the 
distribution of state resources and the control of resources within communal territories add to the difficulties of 
political accommodation in many federations. One is however inclined to agree with Roberts and Oladeji (2005: 
278) that ‘the extant link between resource dependence and conflict derives, not simply from the mere fact that a 
nation enjoys natural resource endowment but more from the manner in which natural resource abundance is 
most often mismanaged’. 
 
2.4 PEACE 
Conceptualizing peace has not yielded itself easily. There is no one known definition that exhaustively clarifies it. 
What we therefore have is a myriad of perspectives. It is probably out of this sheer complexity that one writer 
have observed that ‘We may have all possible reasons against war--but how does this help us when we are 
unable to say what peace is, can be, shall be?’ (Rudolf Pannwitz, 1950). 
For the purpose of this paper, we find the definition provided by the Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
very instructive. It conceives peace as ‘a quality describing a society or a relationship that is operating 
harmoniously’. It assumes peace ‘is commonly understood as the absence of hostility, or the existence of healthy 
or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships’. It extends to include ‘safety in matters of social or 
economic welfare, the acknowledgment of equality and fairness in political relationships and, in world matters’. 
Thus, ‘peacetime is a state of being absent of any war or conflict’. 
Conceptualization of the nature of peace is also enmeshed with considerations of the causes of its 
absence or loss. Among these potential causes are: insecurity, social injustice, economic inequality, political and 
religious radicalism, and acute racism and nationalism (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). From the Anglo-
Norman pas, and meaning "freedom from civil disorder", the English word came into use in various personal 
greetings from c.1300 as a translation of the biblical terms pax and Greek   eirene, which in turn were renderings 
of the Hebrew shalom (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). Shalom, cognate with the Arabic "salaam” has 
multiple meanings: safety, welfare, prosperity, security, fortune, friendliness. The personalized meaning is 
reflected in a nonviolent lifestyle, which also describes a relationship between any people characterized by 
respect, justice and goodwill. This latter understanding of peace can also pertain to an individual's sense of 
himself or herself, as to be "at peace" with one's own mind attested in Europe from c.1200 (Wikipedia, the free 
encyclopedia). The early English term is also used in the sense of “quiet”, reflecting a calm, serene, and 
meditative approach to the family or group relationships that avoids quarreling and seeks tranquility — an 
absence of disturbance or agitation(Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). 
For the purpose of this study, it will suffice to conceptualize peace as the absence of war, violence, 
conflict and the deployment of force in the relations between the central government, the units and its members 
for the purpose of resolving differences. In other words, it perceives peace as a state in which differences among 
members and units of the federation are resolved without recourse to the use of force but through means that 
ensure justice, fairness and equity. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper is anchored on the theoretical premise that political behavior in any state is directly and critically 
related to its political culture. It is argued that political culture is characterized by the individualistic, the 
moralistic and the traditional subcultures (Elazar, 1972). Political culture is itself a product of dialectical 
historical materialism. 
According to the foregoing characterization of political culture by Elazar, the moralistic subculture 
conceives politics as a way of promoting public interest in a manner that can advance societal conditions. Thus, 
it promotes ‘a strong participatory norm’ in which politics is a concern for both citizens and public officials 
(Peters and Welch, 1978: 346). Consequently, the standard of public conduct is anchored on the moral code, 
which eschews acts that are capable of jeopardizing public interest. 
On the other hand, the individualistic subculture perceives politics as another way to get ahead. 
Therefore, according to Peters and Welch (1978: 346), persons entering politics are expected to do so to 
accumulate wealth and gain personal esteem. In this case, the government is not meant to advance the public 
interest but individual interests and concerns. The traditional subculture shares the character of the individualistic 
in the sense that it is marked by an elitist political style in which ‘public officials are expected to benefit 
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personally from politics’(Peters and Welch, 1978: 346). In the same vein, both cultures, as Elazar (1972: 95) 
observed, have a high tolerance of corruption because politics is restricted to a class of elites. 
In every political system, it is the conduct and the activities of private and public officials perceived as 
norms that affect the promotion or otherwise of peace, stability and growth. One of such norms is clientele 
politics. Here, politics is essentially based on patron-client relationships. According to Hague and Harrop (2001: 
116), it is a technique common to authoritarian leaders with strong inclination to structure political participation. 
It is also a relationship in which government agencies advance the interest of the client groups they are 
responsible for supervising and regulating (Heywood, 2005: 364). Politics in a clientele state is therefore the 
practice where particular groups in the polity receive a disproportionate policy advantage on the basis of their 
access to policy makers at the expense of the larger society (Kesselman et al, 1996:633). 
In a way, this may facilitate the consensus building process and benefit the polity in a developed state. 
However, in a developing state such as Nigeria, this is most likely to prove counter- productive, dysfunctional 
and impinge the course of peace, stability and progress. The enormity of the effect of clientele politics on 
Nigeria was noted by Kesselman et al (1996, 633) when they observed the manifest neglect of her public 
infrastructure and the prevention of the full utilization of her productive capacities. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
This study is a product of historical research methodology. It is therefore an ex-post facto research. It depends 
largely on content analysis of secondary source materials such as books, journals, magazines, and newspapers. 
All source materials were subjected to historical criticism to validate them and their contents. This also ensured 
the elimination of possible distortions in their contents. 
 
5. FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA 
Nigeria’s federalism is one of the legacies bequeathed to her by colonialism. It dates back to the 1946 and 1954 
constitutions. The First Republic provided the first indigenous attempt at Nigeria’s experimentation with the 
inherited federal system of government. Under this arrangement, the Nigerian state was structured into three 
regions. In 1963, a fourth region was added. These were the Northern, Eastern, Western and Mid-Western 
regions. Between the regions and the Federal Capital Territory of Lagos, political   power was devolved in a 
manner that defined the federal character of the Nigerian state. Though the ethnic minority groups of the Niger 
Delta expressed their grievances against their perceived marginalization in this regional arrangement, it was the 
advent of the military in Nigerian politics that exacerbated the conditions that produced violent conflicts and 
eroded peace in the area. 
This is because the advent of military autocracy aborted the process of federalization in Nigeria. 
According to Obianyo (quoted in Alli, 2005: 183), ‘It is not out of place to state that the federal process came to 
a halt with military rule in Nigeria’. It embarked on the centralization of political power in the manner that 
conformed to its unitary character. The unitary command character of the military was imposed on the Nigerian 
state to make it amenable to military rule. Beginning with the overt attempt of the Ironsi junta at decreeing 
Nigeria into a unitary state to the pretentious attempts of the subsequent military regimes at federal restructuring, 
Nigeria went through a long, tedious and tortuous journey into over-centralization of political power, distortion 
of relations between the federating units and the disarticulation of the Nigerian federalization project. The 1979 
and the 1999 constitutions authored by the military and bequeathed to the succeeding civilian regimes were 
anything but federal except in name. The attempts at practicing them have resulted in great complications such 
as are manifest in the serious breaches of peace in the Niger Delta. 
 
6. RESOURCE CONTROL IN NIGERIA 
Nigeria is a mono-cultural economy. Over ninety percent of the revenue of state is earned from the oil sector. 
This implies also that Nigeria is a natural resource dependent state. The sharing of the revenue accruing from this 
resource has been particularly problematic, resulting in a cacophony of contending perspectives on its ownership 
and control. Resource control is one of the perspectives that are being strongly canvassed as an alternative to the 
central control currently practiced in Nigeria. 
The central control of natural resources currently in force in Nigeria is premised on the economic 
assumption that it has the capacity to bring about macroeconomic stabilization and the redistribution of income 
and wealth. This stems from the assumption that the central government is alive to its developmental 
responsibilities to all parts of the country in a manner that demonstrates justice and equity. As Roberts and 
Oladeji (2005: 277-278) have pointed out, ‘this is not always the case, especially where the central government’s 
responsibility is mediated and undermined by the strong influence of ethnicity and regionalism’. They further 
observed that whenever this is the case, the inequalities in fiscal federalism and the politicization of the 
principles governing resource sharing lead to a clamor for resource control. The history of resource control in 
Nigeria appears to lay credence to this position. 
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Resource control, in this discourse, is perceived as one of the manifestations of the struggles of the 
ethnic minority peoples of the Niger Delta to redress perceived injustices and inequalities in fiscal relations 
among ethnic nationalities, regions and political units within the Nigerian federation. It is also perceived as 
necessary fallout of the degradation of their environment and the callous neglect of their conditions by the 
central government, which is seen as advancing the interests of the ethnic majorities to the detriment of the 
minorities. 
The agitation for resource control by the Niger Delta ethnic minorities stems primarily from the 
trajectories of the nation’s fiscal federalism. Between the 1940s and the mid-1970s, particularly before oil and 
gas became the dominant sources of revenue, the control of natural resources would seem to have been vested in 
the regional governments. Though the 1963 constitution did not provide for the ownership and control of mineral 
resources by the producing states, their entitlement to fifty percent of the proceed (Roberts and Oladeji, 2005: 
282) based on the provisions of the derivation principle, and a share in another 30 percent, with the Federal 
Government being entitled to only 20 percent (Roberts and Oladeji, 2005: 282) made it almost impossible for the 
producing states to feel alienation, marginalized or unfairly treated in any form in the distribution of national 
wealth. From the mid-1970s, when oil and gas took the center stage as the nation’s revenue earner, the 
prominence of the derivation principle did not only begin to recede, but also natural resources became 
increasingly centrally controlled. 
This twist of event has been accounted for by the allegation that with the ascendancy of oil as the major 
revenue spinner of the federation, ‘the intelligentsia of the ruling majority ethnic groups considered derivation 
excessively favoring the minority oil producing states and hence, negating the principles of equity and fairness, 
among other values’ (Roberts and Oladeji, 2005: 282). In the same vein, Mbanefo and Egwakhide (1998) noted 
that the recession of derivation in the revenue sharing formula was related to the ‘political’ reasoning that it had 
the potential to lead to a radical shift in revenue from the very influential and powerful majority groups to the 
minority. 
Consequently, the revenue realized by the oil producing states from derivation principle became 
negligible in the 1980s (Mbanefo and Egwakhide, 1998). This status quo was sustained through the Revenue 
Mobilization and Fiscal Commission which ensured that only one percent of the Federation Account was set 
aside and shared among the mineral producing states on the basis of derivation. 
It was during the constitutional conference and the Constituent Assembly in 1996 that the need for the 
peoples of the oil producing areas to have a greater share of the revenues derived from their areas became 
acknowledged as worthy of fair consideration. It was on this premise that a section was inserted into the 1999 
constitution to provide that: 
the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not 
less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any 
natural resources(Nigeria,1999). 
In spite of this provision, it took intense agitation by the oil producing states for the provision to be implemented. 
When the provision was eventually implemented, the Federal Government limited it by subtracting the 
percentage attributed to the offshore oil, which according to extant legislations in Nigeria, belonged to the 
Federal Government. 
With the failure of the central government to live up to its developmental responsibilities to the ethnic 
minorities of the Niger Delta, it did not take long before the central control of resources begin to run into 
troubled waters, which generated several agitations by ethnic nationalities and militias that breached the peace of 
the nation. 
 
7. THE BREAKDOWN OF PEACE IN THE NIGER DELTA 
The violation of peace is not novel in the history of the Niger Delta. Though, it may be convenient to date this 
development in post-independence Nigeria to the 12-day revolt of Isaac Adaka Boro in 1966, the historical 
process predates independence. The breakdown of peace in the Niger Delta is better understood within the 
context of the prevailing trajectories of nation-building in Nigeria. This paper disagrees that the hiccups faced by 
the Nigerian federal state in creating and sustaining peace as part of its nation-building efforts are rooted in the 
“mistake of 1914”, though it concurs that they have some colonial origin(Ayokhai, 2009a,b). 
On 1st April, 1939, the British Colonial Governor of Nigeria, Bernard Bourdillon, divided Southern 
Nigeria into two halves, Western and Eastern Regions. Some scholars argue that the justification of dividing the 
southern region was in recognition of its heterogeneous composition. The division, they argue, allowed the 
Yoruba and Igbo peoples in the south some control over their territories (Banigo, 2008). The larger Northern 
region was retained as one administrative and political unit. Some scholars posit that the retention of the 
Northern region as a single political unit was informed by the fact that ‘it was considered homogenous, easy to 
administer and generally peaceful’ (Ogbogbo, 2006). 
Whatever is the real reason for the colonial division of Nigeria, the important thing is that the ethnic 
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groups in the Niger Delta found themselves split into two different regions in which they suffered the status of 
minorities. As Ogbogbo (2006) noted, this split up, ostensibly for administrative convenience, resulted in the 
balkanization of the territorially contiguous peoples of the Niger Delta into two political and administrative units 
as minorities. 
The effect of the regional policy on the Niger Delta peoples has been captured by Okorobia (quoted in 
Banigo, 2008: 353) as follows: 
If there was any single policy which was so effectively used to internally colonize and underdevelop the 
erstwhile virile and progressive city-states of the Eastern Delta, it was the regional policy...as a result of 
this policy our study area (Eastern Niger Delta) was brought under the social, political and economic 
domination of the larger, aggressive and self conscious Igbo ethnic nationality. A number of political, 
economic and social policies and programmes were initiated and executed by the Eastern Region 
Government, and these had more negative than positive impact for the land and people of Eastern Niger 
Delta. Some of these impacts have been so grave that not even the creation of states had been able to 
mitigate them.  
With this kind of perception of their place in Nigeria, the Niger Delta peoples acted to liberate themselves from 
“internal colonialism” by the larger ethnic groups. The agitation for state creation became important to the Niger 
Delta peoples because it was a sure way to assert their distinctive self-identity, liberate their people, control 
natural resources in their domain and gain political space in the polity. The period between 1954 and 1959 
witnessed intensive politicking by the Niger Delta peoples to realize their dream of a separate state. This failed at 
the 1957 constitutional  conference in London, but it led to the establishment of the Henry Willink Commission 
(1958), which later assembled ‘to ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to 
propose means of  allaying those fears whether well or ill founded. Though, the commission did not recommend 
the creation of a state for the Niger Delta, it however recognized a widespread neglect of the peoples, their 
peculiar environmental difficulties, and recommended the establishment of a mechanism to cater for the needs of 
the area (Report of the Willink Commission, 1958: 94). 
Though the Niger Delta peoples were disappointed at the outcome of the Willink Commission, they 
were not deterred. They established the Niger Delta Congress, a political party, to continue the constitutional 
agitation for the creation of state. The party participated in the 1959 elections but its candidate lost in the election. 
The party’s manifesto was however clear as to its position when it stated that “The Niger Delta should be 
exorcised from the Eastern and Western Regions and be constituted into a unit of the Nigerian federation with 
simple governmental mechanisms seated in the territory to foster economic, political and social programmes” 
( Banigo, 2005: 65). 
The frustration suffered by the constitutional means deployed to press home the Niger Delta cause led 
Isaac Adaka Boro to form the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) with 150 warriors. He tried to pull out the 
Ijo people of the Niger Delta by a violent struggle for self-determination into a new state called the Niger Delta 
Republic. The twelve days rebellion was violently crushed by the Nigerian state and Isaac Boro and two of his 
accomplices secured the death penalty. 
The hegemonic struggles that characterized the politics of the First Republic eventually played out in 
favor of the Western Delta minorities when the NPC – NCNC coalition government successful excised them 
from the Yoruba dominated Western Region controlled by the Action Group (AG). The creation of the Midwest 
Region in 1963 did not however liberate the Eastern Delta minority ethnic groups. For instance, about a quarter 
of a million (Report of the Willink Commission, 1958) Ijo people still remained in the Eastern Region dominated 
by the Igbo. 
The January 15, 1966 coup terminated the First Republic and ushered in the military government of the 
federation. In July, 1966, the Ironsi led regime was overthrown in a counter-coup that brought the Gowon 
government on board, but not before he had decreed Nigeria into a unitary state. The Gowon regime, which was 
confronted with the secession of the Eastern Region under Ojukwu was forced by exigencies of the war situation 
to reconstitute the four regions structure of the federation into a twelve state structure as part of measures aimed 
at forestalling the disintegration of the nation. This arrangement further liberated the ethnic minorities of the 
Niger Delta left in the Eastern region. The nineteen state structure bequeathed by the Murtala regime which 
succeeded Gowon’s regime further expanded the political space for all Nigerian ethnic groups, including the 
Niger Delta minority ethnic groups. The Shagari civilian regime that succeeded the Murtala/Obasanjo regime left 
no legacy of state creation or restructuring. It was plagued by the same problems that characterized the First 
Republic and was overthrown by another military coup in 1983 and Buhari became Head of State. Probably, the 
brevity of the regime, which was overthrown in 1985, did not live it much space to live any noticeable positive 
impact on the historical landscape of Nigeria. Save for its draconian laws and rule, the regime is hardly 
remembered for anything tangible (Ayokhai, 2009b: 108). 
The period between 1985 and 1999 is often considered the most significant in the history of military 
governance in post-civil war Nigeria. Though the period saw increase in the number of states to twenty – one, 
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then thirty – one and later thirty – six, it is argued that the conditions that engendered conflict and enthroned the 
breach of peace were largely created or exacerbated in the period. 
It is argued that this long period of military rule led to the consolidation of the militarization of social 
life and public psyche. Dr. Frederick Fasheun (quoted in Akinwumi 2003: 349-350), the leader of one of 
Nigeria’s ethnic militias buttressed this position when he noted that:  
We had a type of military government that made itself repressive and malevolently coercive. However, 
the long exposure to coercion and repression so successfully bastardized our psyche and destroyed our 
vital values that Nigerians even protested when soldiers were temporarily withdrawn to the barracks, 
with traditional rulers leading delegations to military administrators to beg for restoration of military 
presence in the streets. We no longer felt safe without this undue militarization. Yet the military 
personnel delighted in brutalizing the “bloody civilian” populace, seizing traders’ goods, confiscating 
their wares and destroying people’s property and dwellings. Each successive military government 
created a terror squad by which it became known and remembered. And such squads did nothing but 
help their founders to perpetuate corruption, militarization and repression. 
In a similar vein, erstwhile Chief of Army Staff under Sani Abacha, Gen. Chris Ali (quoted in Akinwumi, 2003: 
350) maintains that: 
...the Nigerian psyche has been moulded into a frame of militancy and respect for the use of force.... 
The course of jungle law has been promoted by the state through terrorism, torture, murder and by 
every conceivable means, but due process. 
The most visible evidence of militarization is found in the extra-judicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight 
others by the Nigerian State under the leadership of Gen. Sani Abacha. Saro-Wiwa was an environmental right 
activist who sought to redress the devastation of his Ogoni homeland through the activities of oil exploration by 
multi-national corporations and the Nigerian state. There is no doubt that  this singular action of the state went a 
long way in strengthening the resolve of groups in the Niger Delta to resort to militant expression of defiance 
against  the oppressive rule of the Nigerian state and its penchant  for the deployment of force in resolving 
matters of resource control and nation-building. It was like blowing the whistle to call out the peoples to take up 
arms. The killing of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) leaders cleared any doubt that 
might have existed. They became convinced that the only logic the Nigerian state understood was the use of 
force. 
When we add up this to the socio-economic hardship which the mass of Nigerians were subjected to as 
a result of failed governmental policies and programs such as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), it is 
not difficult to see the source of the army of unemployed youths which serviced the various militia groups across 
the country, including the Niger Delta’s. 
 
8. INTERFACING FEDERALISM, RESOURCE CONTROL AND PEACE IN THE NIGER DELTA 
The negotiation for resource control by the peoples of Niger Delta has expressed itself, especially in the last two 
decades in the form of conflict, violence and the deployment of force. The Niger Delta conflict and the 
consequent loss of peace are a fall-out of the “National Question” that is plaguing the federal state in Nigeria. 
Though, it has been dated back to the colonial period, this paper does not subscribe to the view that the 1914 
amalgamation was a mistake. Nonetheless, it agrees that the breakdown of peace in the Niger Delta is, partly, a 
fall out of the colonial process. This position requires some explanations. First, the amalgamation was carried out 
by the colonialist on behalf of the imperial state to serve its interest. Thus, if the amalgamation fulfilled its 
colonialist agenda, then Lord Lugard could not have made a mistake. The true mistake in this respect lies with 
Nigerian scholars perceiving colonization as a paternalistic service to Africa, including Nigeria (Ayokhai, 2009a, 
b). Second, Nigerian Scholars also assume that the indigenous state systems did not face challenges similar to the 
ones being faced by the post-independence Nigerian state. The evidence of civil wars in the Sokoto Caliphate, 
among the Yoruba city-states that succeeded the Oyo Empire, which itself is a case study for conflict in the 
nineteenth century, and the Benin Kingdom, to mention a few, suggests a contrary historical reality(Ayokhai, 
2009a,b). Third, ethnicists in Nigeria are often guilty of wrongful assumption when they suggest that the 
Nigerian federal state should be restructured in such a manner as to coincide with ethnic boundaries.  This 
perspective derives from the wrong assumption that pre-colonial Nigerian states were organized exclusively on 
kinship basis. The historical evidence from the Sokoto Caliphate, Oyo Empire, Benin Empire, Ibadan City-State, 
the Niger Delta city-states, etc. suggests the contrary. Rather, the historical reality is that the colonial 
amalgamation of Nigeria is, in the least, an indication that a Nigerian State is feasible. It is in the inadvertent 
admission of this much that the ‘nationalists’ did not opt to go their different ethnic ways during the process that 
led to the independence of Nigeria (Ayokhai, 2009a, b). 
The breakdown of peace in the Niger Delta did not derive from the mistake of the colonialists as much 
as it is from the mismanagement of resources and the Nigerian federal system by the elites entrusted with the 
task. Having made this point, it is important to further clarify the objective content of federalism, resource 
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control and peace in the Niger Delta. These issues therefore are a part of minority rights agitations in Nigeria. 
Suberu (1996: xi) pointed out this when he noted that ‘Ethnic minority tensions and agitations are an important 
feature of the ongoing struggles to resolve the “national question”. 
Beside the agitation of the ethnic minority in the Niger Delta against their ‘subjugation’ in the two 
regions in southern Nigeria which was initially characterized by demands for the creation of states  for the 
minority groups, the 1980s witnessed the expansion of the scope of the Niger Delta conflict to include more 
demands. These demands have been summarized to include the need for the federal state to address the 
underdevelopment and official neglect of the region (Nigeria: Vol.1 Report of the Special Security Committee 
on Oil Producing Areas), the return to the practice in the country before petroleum became significant, (namely 
the full implementation of the derivation principle), adoption of the practice in other federations and other oil 
producing countries, which decentralized ownership and control of mineral rights, and the need for 
environmental justice (Roberts, 2005). These demands constitute the content of the conflict which over time 
came to deny the Niger Delta peoples and the Nigerian federal state their highly prized peace. 
Basically, the Niger Delta conflict has shifted focus from the demand for the creation of states for the 
ethnic minority groups in the region to the demand for justice for environmental degradation and pollution 
occasioned by oil exploration and the review of fiscal relations between states and communities in the region on 
the one hand and the central government in the Nigerian federal state on the other. Consequently, a series of 
governmental actions in the practice of Nigeria’s federalism in reaction to the demands of the peoples of the 
Niger Delta have further aggravated the feeling of marginalization. The invasion of Odi in 1999 by the federal 
army, the legal resolution of the onshore-offshore dichotomy in favor of the federal government, the ceding of 
the Bakassi Peninsula and the shoddy handling of the resettlement of the Bakassi returnees in their fatherland, 
the failure of the national conference conveyed by the federal government to resolve the vexed issue of an 
acceptable revenue sharing formula and the blatant refusal by the federal government to return to the fifty 
percent derivation principle of the first republic ‘has generated intense controversy and anger in the Niger 
Delta’(Naanen, 2007). This has not also been helped by the failure to reverse the environmental degradation and 
pollution of the region, the absence of and dilapidation of social infrastructures in the region and the poverty of 
the people. The deployment of the Joint Task Force (JTF) of the Nigerian Army to engage the militants has 
further complicated relations between the federal government and the Niger Delta peoples and further 
endangered peace. 
The Niger Delta peoples argue that their condition has remained largely unchanged because the skewed 
federal system practiced in Nigeria ‘continues to ensure the transfer of resources from the Delta region to other 
parts of the country while the main source of the wealth remains neglected and poor’ (Naanen, 2007). By and 
large, the Niger Delta conflict and the accompanying breach of peace are a product of the failure of the Nigerian 
federal system to resolve the feeling of marginalization as perceived in the non-resolution of the issues of 
resource control, revenue allocation, environmental degradation, underdevelopment and poverty of the ethnic 
minority peoples of the region, among others. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
From the forgoing, it appears tenable to reach the conclusion that, though the attractiveness of federalism as a 
governance mechanism derives from its potential to meet the demand in contemporary political systems for 
constructing an efficient, dynamic and peaceful modern state, it has not lived up to this expectation in Nigeria. 
Rather, the evidence from this study points to the fact that federalism, as practiced in Nigeria, did not only fail to 
avert conflict, violence and the deployment of force in  the negotiation for resource control, but also promoted 
the breach of peace through national fiscal policies which the peoples of the Niger Delta considered hostile. 
The way out of the cycle of conflict, violence and force in Nigeria is first to rethink the theory of peace 
from which the current panacea for resource control flows. Public policy actions, and sometimes statements, 
strongly reflect a perception of peace as the mere absence or termination of conflict and violence. The action by 
the Joint Task Force (JTF) of the Nigerian military and the consequent amnesty program aimed at disarming the 
Niger Delta militants lay credence to this position. Also, since the nature of Nigeria’s federal state is as 
essentially structured by the military governments; there is no doubt that the military’s perception of peace as 
essentially the termination of conflict and violence through the engagement of force and related strategies has 
gravely impacted it. This in turn has made the Nigerian model of federalism antithetical to peace building. 
Therefore, a new concept and theory of peace, which leans more towards "peace as community” (Peck, 
1987); "peace as action" (Cox, 1986) and peace as reducing separation appears to be the way forward. Of these, I 
suggest that conceptualizing peace as reducing separation may be the most useful. This is partly because it 
incorporates "community" and "action", and community is by definition less separated than non-community 
while reducing implies action. The thinking here is that once the proper concept of peace is adopted and 
operationalized  in the character of a new model of federal system, resolving the resource control debacle will 
not entail conflict, violence and force and genuine peace would have been restored and the fear of a relapse 
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would have been allayed once and for all. 
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